Wednesday, 17 September 2025 Early commentary of upcoming United States National Defence Strategy 2025 suggests accelerated recalibrations in its defence posture, signalling an even greater emphasis on their homeland, and elevated prioritisation of the Caribbean and South America. This evolved military direction reportedly outlines a shift away from countering Beijing in our region, and towards more inwards focused projects, including interdicting alleged drug-terrorist movements as we saw 2 Sep 2025. US Indo-Pacific pivot finally dead? While still subject to formal approval, this seismic strategic adjustment is already reflected in recent US defence investments and operational choices. The Golden Dome homeland defence system, expanded domestic deployments, and increased regional enforcement activities evidence a tangible pivot toward internal security and US near-region stability. Some will argue the US pivot from Europe and the Middle East never got started - messages from the US today suggest it never will. For Australia, this evolving posture presents both challenges and (possibly) opportunities. It’s true that the bilateral relationship remains strong, but the strategic environment continues to shift. Australia’s principal security partner is navigating complex domestic and regional dynamics, and its global posture may be less expansive than previous decades. ANZUS and more lately AUKUS remain foundational – but if the US is less regionally present militarily – then a more self-reliant and regionally coherent Australian defence posture becomes even more urgent. The % GDP question Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy makes clear the increasingly complex threat landscape. It says that responding effectively will require a coordinated national effort, including a sustained uplift in defence investment. While Australia will and must decide how much to invest in National Defence (note: this is a more expansive definition, akin to NATO, where roads, bridges, technologies get rolled into the calculation) voices from the US are crystal clear. Lift defence spending to 3.5% or Australia, you don’t get a Presidential meeting (without public beat-down risk). Funding national priorities when times are tight It’s potentially a bleak picture (a) less present, less reliable US military partner, (b) geo-strategic pressure to spend more on defence, (c) more expectations from Pacific partners, rightly asking why they shouldn’t accept Beijing’s support, and (d) rising non-defence priorities the Australian public expects Government to prioritise. Nobody has cogently explained the rules are changing! Doing more with less is a good start and we can expect the Government to start there. However longer term, it's always better to do more with more. The ‘more’ in this instance is drawn from the growing consensus that both public and private capital is essential to closing the gap. Private, federal, super, states - it may all need to be harnessed this time. Private investment could, for example, play a critical role in accelerating innovation and enhancing defence readiness. This will require acquisition models that support commercial participate reward company-funded R&D, and enable faster, more affordable delivery of capability. Freeing federal cash for health, education and other priorities Australians simply will not accept go under-funded. Australia should also continue investing in the US defence industrial base to preserve interoperability and maintain access to critical technologies. At the same time, our posture needs to continue to emphasise both sovereign and networked – capable of independent action, while contributing meaningfully to a level of collective security. Other people’s money The Australian government getting better at using other Australians’ money could be just one part of the answer. Strategic regional partnerships are also evolving and could also aid us to maximise our investment outcomes. The US-led alliance structure is increasingly characterised by distributed capability and shared influence - let’s take that to Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Indonesia. In this context, Australia and other allies are not junior partners reliant on a central US node, but strategic contributors to a broader regional network. Not focused on any adversary or ally but on Indo-Pacific security and stability. Right time, right place Australia is well-positioned to serve as a light touch ‘regional integrator’ linking technologies, industrial partners, and supply chains between Indo-Pacific friends. With an agenda focused on regional stability, economic growth and inclusiveness there is a middle way emerging. Our neighbours face similar challenges, together that becomes the kernel of an opportunity. The decision to procure the upgraded Japanese Mogami-class frigate could be framed as a first step toward regional capability integration. Facilitating the regional flow of technology and expertise. As the global order continues to shift, Australia can choose to respond with strategic clarity, industrial ambition, and a form of regional leadership that leverages how our friends in region are also feeling. The path forward will require thoughtful engagement, sustained investment, and a clear-eyed view of our evolving security landscape.